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This article analyses the recent exchange of letters between two UN human rights mandate-
holders and the Blackstone Group L.P., a private equity firm with significant investments in 
the rental housing market in multiple jurisdictions. The mandate-holders argue that 
Blackstone’s investments are causing serious harm to the right to housing, including 
retrogressing affordability, and increasing evictions, homelessness and housing-related poverty. 
The scale of investment displaces communities and reshapes the housing landscape for the next 
generation. Blackstone’s rebuttal was, in part, predicated on their subservience to market forces 
and their obeying the law in all jurisdictions. This is largely accurate, indicating that markets 
and their constitutive rules permit and incentivize retrogressive housing outcomes. The paper 
therefore argues that promoting socio-economic rights under financialized globalization 
requires challenging the engrained norms of marketization. International human rights law 
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In March 2019 Leilani Farha, the UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on the Right to Housing and 
Surya Deva, Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises (hereinafter, ‘the UN mandate-
holders’) wrote to Blackstone Group L.P. (Blackstone) regarding their investments in housing,1 
noting allegations of harmful practices in multiple countries.2 Blackstone responded to the 
letter, stating that it ‘contains numerous false claims, significant factual errors and inaccurate 
conclusions’.3 The UN mandate-holders also wrote letters to the governments of the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the USA discussing their policies in relation 
to Blackstone and similar companies.4 This article will describe these letters, focusing on the 
exchange with Blackstone, in so doing contextualizing the right to housing in relation to the 
developing ‘financialization of housing’.5  
 
Blackstone is described as ‘one of the largest real estate private equity firms in the world’,6 
with $512 billion in assets under management.7 One common Blackstone practice is to seek 
out ‘undervalued’ assets – often apartment buildings housing low-income tenants in gentrifying 
areas with weak tenant protection – purchase them, and significantly increase rental prices.8 
Such acts reduce the affordability of housing,9 and cause a range of subsequent issues including 
 
1 Mandates of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Letter to the Blackstone Group, OL 
OTH 17/2019, 22 March 2019 [Blackstone Letter]. 
2 id. 4. 
3 Blackstone Group, Reply to the Mandate Holders, OL OTH 17/2019, 25 March 2019 [Blackstone Reply]. 
4 Mandates of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Letter to the Czech Republic, OL CZE 
2/2019, 22 March 2019 [Czech Republic Letter]; Letter to Denmark, OL DNK 2/2019, 22 March 2019 
[Denmark Letter]; Letter to Ireland, OL IRE 2/2019, 22 March 2019 [Ireland Letter]; Letter to Spain, OL ESO 
3/2019, 22 March 2019 [Spain Letter]; Letter to Sweden, OL SWE 1/2019, 22 March 2019 [Sweden Letter]; 
Letter to the United State of America, OL USA 2/2019, 22 March 2019 [US Letter]. 
5 Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of 
living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context: The Financialization of housing and the right to 
adequate housing, A/HRC/34/51, 18 January 2017, [UNSR, Financialization]. 
6 Blackstone Letter, n 1, 1-2. 
7 Blackstone, ‘Blackstone Reports First Quarter 2019 Results and Announces Conversion to Corporation’, 2019, 
1 [Blackstone Report] at: 
https://s1.q4cdn.com/641657634/files/doc_financials/2019/q1/Blackstone1Q19EarningsPressRelease.pdf, (last 
visited 31 July 2019).   
8 Blackstone Letter, n 1, 4-5. 
9 id. 3. 




increased evictions and homelessness.10 Blackstone frequently defend their practices through 
reference to market forces and to their legal compliance.11 This is accurate in that Blackstone 
is neither breaching domestic law and nor does it hold monopoly power over the market.12 
Rather, the market and its constitutive rules appear to allow and encourage harmful practices 
in breach of state duties and business responsibilities toward the right to housing and related 
rights.13 It is submitted therefore that direct engagement with markets, market actors and their 
constitutive rules must be the next frontier of socio-economic rights promotion.14  
 
The background to the Blackstone letters is the UNSR’s 2017 report into the financialization 
of housing.15 The UNSR argues that ‘[h]ousing and real estate markets have been transformed 
by corporate finance’.16 She defines the financialization of housing as ‘structural changes in 
housing and financial markets and global investment whereby housing is treated as a 
commodity, a means of accumulating wealth and often as security for financial instruments 
that are traded and sold on global markets.’17 Real estate is a $217 trillion market.18 Various 
specific forms of investment constitute or are linked to ‘financialization’. These include the 
large-scale purchase of ‘multi-family rentals’ (MFRs – this term usually refers to apartment 
buildings) by corporate investors; the purchasing of properties as financial assets;  state policies 
such as ‘golden visas’ in exchange for property investment, and lower taxes and investment-
friendly policies that are used to attract capital.19 Financialization is spurred by new credit and 
financial tools such as mortgage-backed securities that allow mortgages to be bundled and sold, 
the increasing mobility of capital, algorithmic price setting, and was accelerated significantly 
by the global financial crisis, which caused foreclosures and therefore a glut of cheap property 
 
10 id. 3-4; Ireland Letter, n 4, 3. 
11 Blackstone Reply, n 3, 2-3. 
12 id. 2-3. 
13 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 
January 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR]; U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
14 Such an argument can be seen as a way past critiques of human rights as inegalitarian and neoliberal, see 
below, and for some examples: Stephen Hopgood, The endtimes of human rights. Cornell University Press, 
2013; Samuel Moyn, Not enough: Human rights in an unequal world. Harvard University Press, 2018. For more 
positive engagement in this direction see: Radhika Balakrishnan, James Heintz, and Diane Elson. Rethinking 
Economic Policy for Social Justice: The radical potential of human rights, Routledge, 2016; Paul O'Connell, 
‘On the human rights question’ Human Rights Quarterly 40.4 (2018) 962. 
15 UNSR, Financialization, n. 5, para. 26.  
16 id. para. 2. 
17 id. para. 1. 
18 id. para. 3. 
19 id. para. 23. 




in the US and Europe, much of which was bought by corporate investors.20 In 2017, $435bn of 
newly raised capital entered the global real estate market.21 
 
Financialization transforms the logic of housing, displacing communities for the sake of 
profit,22 and ‘disconnect[ing] housing from its social function of providing a place to live in 
security and dignity.’23 It accelerates the already rapid retrogression of affordability in ‘prime 
locations’ that are ‘safe havens’ for capital and pushes lower-income households into peri-
urban areas.24 House prices in ‘so-called “hedge cities” like Hong Kong, London, Munich, 
Stockholm, Sydney and Vancouver have increased by over 50 per cent since 2011’.25 Investor-
owned homes often lie empty [stat].26 It increases the risks of both dangerous levels of debt 
and of evictions, creating ‘unprecedented housing precarity’.27 The increased concentration in 
ownership leads to money flowing from communities to ‘remote investors’, increasing 
inequality.28 This creates a vicious cycle in which corporate investment pushes up prices, 
making home ownership less feasible and so expanding the rental market, encouraging more 
investors into the market, increasing prices again.29  
 
Although ‘financialization’ has garnered significant attention,30 its impacts on human rights, 
and even more so on the right to housing, has been largely neglected. The letters, and the 
UNSR’s report into financialization, present an opportunity to elaborate on how global 
investments and the laws constitutive of them are impacting individuals’ human rights, and, 
perhaps more importantly, how they are reshaping human rights possibilities for future 
generations. The trend is toward the rapid expansion of corporate landlords and investor-owned 
properties, and concomitantly more expensive, more precarious housing, affecting particularly 
the young. Housing precarity creates what Marcuse terms ‘residential alienation’, transient 
 
20 id. para. 19. 
21 Cushman and Wakefield, ‘The Great Wall of Money’ (2017), at: 
http://www.cushmanwakefield.com/en/research-and-insight/2017/great-wall-of-money-2017 (last visited 30 
October 2019). 
22 UNSR, Financialization, n. 5, para. 35-37. 
23 id. para. 1. 
24 id. para. 4. 
25 id. para 26. 
26 id. para 30. 
27 id. para. 5. 
28 id. paras. 28; 34-38. 
29 See generally Manuel Aalbers, The financialization of housing: A political economy approach. Routledge, 
2016. 
30 Gerald Epstein, ed. Financialization and the world economy. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005; Natascha Van 
der Zwan, ‘Making sense of financialization’, Socio-economic review 12.1 (2014), 99. 




individuals living in atomized societies. 31  In combination with increased labour market 
flexibility, privatization, and reduced public services, the needs of profit are transforming 
society by gutting the substance, if not the letter, of socio-economic rights, and with it 
substantive community.32 As this article hopes to demonstrate, at least regarding financialized 
housing, the harm is both real and preventable. It requires political action, and the right to 
housing can provide a focal point around which pressure can develop.   
 
The article first briefly describes the relevant human rights law and business responsibilities 
under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in order to 
contextualize later arguments. Next, it focuses on the letters themselves, first describing those 
to states and then focusing on Blackstone. Finally, it concludes by discussing what the 
problems invoked by the letters mean for human rights law and argumentation around socio-
economic rights and markets.  
 
2. International Human Rights Law and Business Responsibilities in the Context of Housing 
2.1. The Right to Housing under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
 
This section reviews the relevant international human rights law and business responsibilities 
toward human rights in relation to the right to housing. The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes ‘the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing.’33 It imposes a range of general obligations upon state parties. All material rights 
therein are subject to the principle of progressive realization, under which fulfilment of the 
rights should increase over time.34 States are obliged to use the maximum of their available 
resources to progressively realise rights.35 Deliberately retrogressive measures, defined as any 
law or policy that either reduces legal protection of a right or causes a quantitative ‘backsliding 
 
31 Peter Marcuse, ‘Residential alienation, home ownership and the limits of shelter policy,’ Journal of Society 
and. Social Welfare 3 (1975), 181. 
32 See e.g. Paul O'Connell, ‘On reconciling irreconcilables: neo-liberal globalisation and human rights’, Human 
Rights Law Review 7.3 (2007), 483; Nicolas Bueno, ‘From the right to work to freedom from work: introduction 
to the human economy’, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 33.4 
(2017), 463.  
33 ICESCR, n 13, Article 11(1). 
34 CESCR General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant) 
E/1991/23, para. 9 [hereinafter CESCR, Comment 3]. 
35 id. para. 10. 




in the effective enjoyment of rights’36 are the negative side of progressive realization, and are 
assumed to be prohibited unless essential to protect ‘the totality of the rights provided for in 
the Covenant’.37 States must ensure that at least a minimum core of each Covenant right is 
guaranteed.38 States hold an obligation ‘of immediate effect’ to ensure that rights ‘will be 
exercised without discrimination’.39 States hold international obligations toward assistance and 
cooperation.40 Finally, states hold obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right.41 Respect 
entails non-interference, protect entails preventing interference in rights by third parties, and 
fulfil entails the progressive realization of rights.42  
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment 4 
elaborates the specific content of the right to housing. The right to housing ‘should be seen as 
the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity’.43 ‘Adequate housing’ must include 
‘adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, 
adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities - 
all at a reasonable cost’.44 From this it defines seven core criteria along which the right to 
housing should be realised: Legal security of tenure; Availability of services, materials, 
facilities and infrastructure; Affordability; Habitability; Accessibility; Location; Cultural 
adequacy.45 Forced evictions are ‘prima facie incompatible’ with the Covenant.46 Therefore, if 
the state causes, or fails to protect third parties from causing, ‘interference’ in the right on any 
such metric it would appear to be in prima facie violation of the Covenant.47 There is however, 
a potential lacuna based on what exactly constitutes ‘interference’ by third parties. Do, for 
 
36 Christian Courtis, Nicholas Lusiani and Aoife Nolan, ‘Two steps forward, no steps back? Evolving criteria on 
the prohibition of retrogression in economic and social rights’ in Economic and social rights after the global 
financial crisis (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014) 121, 123-4. 
37 CESCR, Comment 3, 34, para. 9. 
38 id. para. 10. 
39 id. para. 1. 
40 id. para. 13. 
41 This does not appear in General Comment 3, but was formulated in its final version in 1987 by Asbjorn Eide 
in: Report on the right to adequate food as a human right submitted by Mr. Asbjorn Eide, Special Rapporteur 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 7 July 1987, para. 66 and ff. It had become the standard delineation within the CESCR 
by the time of: General Comment 9 The right to adequate food (art. 11), E/C.12/1999/5 12 May 1999, para. 15 
42 Discussed in: Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law. Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2009.  
43 CESCR General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant) E/1992/23, 
13 December 1991, para. 7 [General Comment 4, Housing] 
44 id. 
45 id. para. 8. 
46 id. para. 18. 
47 id. para. 9. 




example, investments that retrogress the affordability of housing constitute interference, and 
how is interference in this case to be defined and delimited?  
 
General Comment 24 addresses this question, at least partially, elaborating ‘State obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of 
business activities’.48  ‘States would violate their duty to protect Covenant rights… by failing 
to regulate the real estate market and the financial actors operating on that market so as to 
ensure access to affordable and adequate housing for all.’49 This goes beyond ‘protect’ as 
preventing interference when this is defined as ‘actively violating rights’,50 instead explicating 
a requirement that regulation ensures access to housing.51 A related policy example, also under 
‘protect’, is that of ‘exercising rent control in the private housing market as required for the 
protection of everyone’s right to adequate housing.’52  States therefore hold duties, where 
material rights are provided privately, to regulate market actors to ensure that housing is 
accessible to all, including specifically on the metric of affordability. States are therefore 
obligated to prevent Blackstone profiting from reducing the affordability of housing insofar as 
it reduces access to housing. 
 
Such an approach is necessary to retain the full scope of the obligation to fulfil where rights 
are provided privately.53 The state is free to outsource provision of human rights materialities, 
but where it does  the obligation to fulfil therefore entails strict regulation of these private 
providers.54 The state could, in theory, choose minimalistic regulation of markets but provide 
public housing and subsidies to those in need, as is essentially Hong Kong’s approach to 
housing.55 This however causes both serious problems in access to housing, such as low-
income individuals without access to public housing paying high rates for ‘bed space only’ 
 
48 CESCR General comment No. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities, 10 August 2017, E/C.12/GC/24 [General 
Comment 24, Business]. 
49 id. para. 18. 
50 UNSR, Financialization, n. 5, para. 14. 
51 General Comment 24, Business, n 48, para. 18. 
52 id. para. 19. 
53 In relation to privatization see: Aoife Nolan, ‘Privatization and economic and social rights’ Human Rights 
Quarterly 40.4 (2018) 815, 840-41 [Nolan, Privatization]. 
54 id. 840. 
55 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government, ‘Response to the List of Issues raised 
by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in relation to the second periodic 
report of the People’s Republic of China’, para. 55.1-55.7, [hereinafter HKSAR, Response]. 




apartments with substandard security and habitability,56 and/or greatly imperils the obligation 
to use ‘the maximum of its available resources’ to realise all Covenant rights, 57  as the 
government is forced to pay high subsidies to private landlords to meet demand,58 restricting 
its ability to resource rights elsewhere.59 Such a technique would appear at least to be inefficient, 
and most likely in breach of Covenant obligations. The UNSR report on Human Rights-Based 
National Housing Strategies reifies that states must ‘ensure that the actions of private actors 
and investors are consistent with the State’s obligation to fulfil the right to housing.’ 60 
Therefore, there appears to be at least a strong rationale, and most likely a clear obligation, that 
market regulation be designed so as to fulfil the right to housing.  
 
2.2. Other Treaties and Business Responsibilities 
 
The letter to Blackstone addresses its activity in the US, Sweden, Spain, and the Czech 
Republic, though it focuses primarily on the US. The ICESCR has been ratified in each except 
the US, and therefore the right to housing forms no part of US obligations. However, other 
human rights treaties that have been ratified by the US, such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)61 and some that are near-universally ratified and 
therefore can in part constitute customary international law, such as the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC)62 can be invoked to target specific issues related to housing, as can 
 
56 Luke Marsh, ‘The Strategic Use of Human Rights Treaties in Hong Kong’s Cage-Home Crisis: No Way 
Out?’ 3.1 Asian Journal of Law and Society 159 (2016), 164-7 [hereinafter Marsh, Cage-Home]. In Hong Kong, 
the median price for a bed-space only apartment in 2017 was HKD4200 (USD537). The case study used in the 
article features an unsanitary combined kitchen/toilet. Naomi Ng, ‘Coffin cubicles, caged homes and 
subdivisions … life inside Hong Kong’s grim low income housing’, SCMP, 26 September 2016, at:  
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education-community/article/2022430/theyre-just-us-exhibition-
shines-light-hong-kongs (last visited 31 July 2019). 
57 ICESCR, n 13, Art. 2.1.  
58 The UK, for example, spent £9.3 billion in 2016 on housing benefit that went to private landlords. Damien 
Gayle, ‘Private landlords get £9.3bn in housing benefit from taxpayer, says report’, The Guardian 20 August 
2016, at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/aug/20/private-landlords-9bn-housing-benefit-taxpayers-
national-housing-federation-report (last visited 26 July 2019). 
59 As Philip Alston noted in his report on the UK, ‘There were 1.2 million people on the social housing waiting 
list in 2017, but less than 6,000 homes were built that year.’ See: Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights on his mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’, A/HRC/41/39/Add.1, 23 April 2019, para. 22. 
60 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to 
an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context: Human rights-based 
national housing strategies’, 15 January 2018, A/HRC/37/53, para. 121 [UNSR, Housing Strategies]. 
61 CERD is mentioned in USA Letter, n 4, 3-4. 
62 In Philip Alston’s, UNSR on extreme poverty and human rights, mission to the USA, he noted that ‘[p]oor 
children are also significantly affected by the country’s crises regarding affordable and adequate housing. On a 
given night in 2017, about 21 per cent (or 114,829) of homeless individuals were children. See Human Rights 
Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights on his mission to the United 
 




the State Duty to Protect under the UNGPs. 63  In the US there are also powerful social 
movements around housing rights.64 Senators Kamala Harris and Cory Booker have each 
introduced housing bills aimed specifically at helping the poor.65 The discourse and content of 
rights can ground critique and promote improved housing policies, 66  or fail to do so, 67 
regardless of the status of the ICESCR. The UN mandate-holders’ letter to the US strongly 
implicated the right to housing, presumably both on this social grounding and the links to other 
treaty obligations.68 A previous UNSR on the right to housing, Rachel Rolnik, conducted a 
mission to the USA, taking a similar approach.69 Her report mentions the right to housing as 
defined in the General Comment70 alongside other rights that are binding in the USA, such as 
non-discrimination.71  
 
The UNGPs define the direct responsibilities of Blackstone. They cover the ICESCR,72 and 
apply ‘to all business enterprises… wherever they operate’. 73  They therefore apply to 
Blackstone in the US despite the non-ratification of the ICESCR. Under the UNGPs, companies 
hold a responsibility to respect human rights that entails that they ‘avoid causing or contributing 
to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts when 
they occur.’74 An adverse human rights impact is defined as any business ‘action’ that ‘removes 
 
States of America’, A/HRC/38/33/Add.1, 4 May 2018, para. 39; see on the CRC as a potential source of 
customary international law: Arabella Lang, ‘UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: a brief guide’, House 
of Commons Briefing Paper Number 7721 (2016), 4.  
63 USA Letter, n 4, 4-5. 
64 Joe Hoover, "The human right to housing and community empowerment: home occupation, eviction defence 
and community land trusts." Third World Quarterly 36.6 (2015), 1092-1109. 
65 Dylan Matthews, ‘Cory Booker and Kamala Harris’s affordable housing plans, explained’, Vox, 2 February 
2019, at:  
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/2/2/18205913/rent-kamala-harris-cory-booker-poverty (last visited 31 
July 2019). 
66 Gillian MacNaughton and Mariah McGill, ‘Economic and social rights in the United States: implementation 
without ratification’ Northeastern University Law Journal 4 (2012), 365. 
67 For example, in recent Concluding Observations on Hong Kong and the UK the CESCR provided critique of 
state policies related to financialization and evidence of serious retrogressions in affordability, but neither state 
has addressed the issues in significant ways. See e.g. Concluding observations on the second periodic report of 
China, including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 13 June 2014, para. 49; Concluding 
observations on the sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  and Northern Ireland, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, 14 July 2016, para. 49.  
68 For example, ‘The Government of the United States of America has… failed to take measures to ensure 
access to adequate housing for the most vulnerable populations.’ USA Letter, n 4, 1.  
69 Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of 
living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Raquel Rolnik, Mission to the United States of 
America’, A/HRC/13/20/Add.4, 12 February 2012. 
70 id. para. 62. 
71 id. para. 65. 
72 Guiding Principles, n 13, Principle 12. 
73 id. Principle 1; 11. 
74 Guiding Principles, n 13, Principle 13 (a) and (b). 




or reduces the ability of an individual to enjoy his or her human rights’. 75  Therefore 
Blackstone’s actions are to be evaluated on the basis of whether or not they have ‘removed or 
reduced’ any individuals’ enjoyment of their human rights. If Blackstone is reducing 
affordability or any other criterion of the right to housing, and this can be shown to be 
‘removing or reducing’ rights enjoyment of affected individuals, it is causing an adverse impact 
on human rights and should cease this behaviour and provide remedy.76   
 
3. Letters to States and the Effects of Financialization on Local Markets 
 
Before moving onto the Blackstone letters in section four, this section briefly reviews the letters 
that the UN mandate-holders sent governments of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, 
Sweden and the USA. These described three main areas: first, the laws and policies that permit 
and enable the financialization of housing, second, the lack of state intervention to protect and 
assist individuals, and third, the specific human rights issues generated.77  
 
The authors evidence a range of rules that encourage financialization to the detriment of the 
right to housing. For example, in the US ‘at least 176,760 delinquent mortgages [were 
auctioned] at prices that were heavily discounted’. As much as 95 percent of these mortgages 
were bought by private equity firms, and many were turned into private rental properties’.78 
The authors also criticize the ‘favourable tax treatment’ granted to ‘Real Estate Investment 
Trusts’ (REITs). REITs are popular with companies like Blackstone. Their benefits include 
‘that REITs pay no corporate tax as long as 90 percent of a REIT’s profits are floated to the 
unit holder/shareholder; all expenses related to a REIT’s rental activities can be deducted… 
 
75 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights - 
An Interpretative Guide’, HR/PUB/12/02 (2012), 5 [hereinafter Responsibility to Respect]. 
76 The scope of ‘impacts’ is discussed fully in: David Birchall, ‘Any Act, Any Harm, To Anyone: The 
Transformative Potential of “Human Rights Impacts” Under the UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human 
Rights’, 1.2 University of Oxford Human Rights Hub Journal 120 (2019); see also: David Birchall, 
‘‘Unaccountable Contributors and Irremediable Impacts: The Possibility of a Trust Fund for Victims of Large-
Scale Human Rights Impacts Under the UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights’ Australian 
Journal of Human Rights (forthcoming, 2019). 
77 The authors’ describe their rationale for the letters to states as follows: ‘We are writing to express our concern 
with respect to your Government’s practice of adopting laws and policies which treat housing as a commodity 
and undermine the enjoyment of housing as a human right… Our chief concern lies with those laws and policies 
which have allowed unprecedented amounts of global capital to be invested in housing as security for financial 
instruments that are traded on global markets, and as a means of accumulating wealth’, See e.g. Denmark Letter, 
n 4, 1. It should be noted that at the time of writing the Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain and Sweden have 
responded. These responses are collated on the UNSR homepage: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Housing/Pages/FinancializationHousing.aspx (last visited 31 July 2019). 
78 US Letter, n 4, 1-2. 




and [that] a portion of the dividends paid by REITs may constitute a non-taxable return of 
capital.’ 79  Ireland encourages financialization in similar ways, including through tax 
favourable REITs and ‘the establishment of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) 
charged with selling assets to global investors.’80 NAMA has sold 93% of assets to foreign 
investors, mostly to US private equity funds.81 ‘By 2016, one third of all properties sold in 
Ireland were being purchased by investors.’82 The authors also allege that investors in Ireland 
are driving up prices through ‘land hoarding’, wherein ‘investors sit on vacant land to restrict 
supply and thus increase demand and value.’83 
 
The authors critique most states for their inadequate policies to protect and assist individuals. 
Sweden is building 23,000 too few homes per annum.84 In Denmark, developers, including a 
Blackstone subsidiary, North 360, are taking advantage of a law designed to encourage 
renovations in order to raise rents by more than 100%. 85  In Czech Republic, Blackstone 
subsidiary RESIDOMO is alleged to be attempting to evict families prior to redevelopment 
from a building housing many Roma and low-income families.86 Ireland is accused of failing 
to provide sufficient social housing,87 and the US is accused of, inter alia, permitting extremely 
high rental increases and pernicious fee charging, such as, again by Blackstone, a $30 charge 
for paying rent by debit card.88  
 
Various human rights issues stem from the above. In Ireland, ‘the number of homeless adults 
[increased] by nearly 95.9% between 2015 and 2018, whilst levels of child homelessness grew 
by 227.7% over the same period. The central causes of homelessness are issues related to the 
private rental sector.’89 In the US private investors have particularly targeted majority African-
American communities, and therefore the increased rate of eviction notices and rental increases 
is disproportionately targeting this group, potentially in breach of CERD.90 The increased risk 
 
79 id. 2. 
80 Ireland Letter, n 4, 2. 
81 id. 2. 
82 id. 2. 
83 id. 2. 
84 Sweden Letter, n 4, 1-2. 
85 Denmark Letter, n 4, 1-2. 
86 Czech Republic Letter, n 4, 1-2. 
87 Ireland Letter, n 4, 2. 
88 US Letter, n 4, 2. 
89 Ireland Letter, n 4, 3 
90 US Letter, n 4, 3-4 




of evictions and other pressures to leave homes is noted in each letter.91 In Spain for example 
there were 100 evictions a day in 2017. 92  The most common human rights issue is the 
retrogression in affordability,93 which then increases the likelihood of the right to housing 
retrogressing along other criteria, such as individuals being forced into sub-habitable 
accommodation,94 or accommodation in an inadequate location95 or with poor services and 
infrastructure.96 For example, ‘[i]n Dublin rents have increased by 42% in the past six years, 
and a person with an average salary renting the average property now has to allocate 86.3% of 
their earnings on rent.’97 In Sweden average rental rates rose between 59 and 84 per cent from 
2009-2017.98 In Madrid, it is estimated that Blackstone have increased the average rent of 
social housing that was purchased in 2013 by 49%.99 
 
As indicated by the preceding summary, Blackstone is the business actor most frequently 
mentioned in the letters to states. The primary allegation against Blackstone is that they are the 
most efficient global exploiter of this emerging form of investment. Blackstone is described as 
‘a leader in implementing the new residential real estate business model [but] by no means the 
only financial actor [to do so]’.100 The authors identify that the private equity firm I-RES REIT 
is the largest private landlord in Ireland, for example. 101  The next section discusses the 
exchange of letters between the UN mandate-holders and Blackstone. 
 
4. The Blackstone Letters 
The letter to Blackstone was sent under the communications procedure of the Special 
Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council. This allows UN mandate-holders to 
intervene where stakeholders have made allegations of human rights abuses that fall within the 
scope of their mandate. The aim is to clarify the facts of the allegation, inform the party of the 
relevant human rights standards, and to request follow-up action.102 The UN mandate-holders 
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highlight three main issues in their letter to Blackstone: Blackstone’s purchasing of single-
family properties, particularly foreclosed homes in the US; Blackstone’s purchasing of multi-
family properties globally; and that ‘Blackstone is using its significant resources and political 
leverage to undermine domestic laws and policies.’ 103  I will address the allegations and 
Blackstone’s response together, framing the analysis around the two major forms of rebuttal 
by Blackstone, which can be grouped into two, slightly contradictory, categories. The first is 
that Blackstone claims to be providing benefits to communities through their investment in 
housing, their improvement of housing quality, and by behaving as a responsible landlord. The 
second is that, if harm is being caused, that harm can only be blamed on market forces and their 
legal construction, over which Blackstone has no influence. 
 
4.1. The Benefits that Blackstone Provides to Local Communities 
4.1.1. Investing in the Housing Market 
 
Blackstone state that ‘there is no question that insufficient capital is flowing into the housing 
sector which has in turn caused a significant undersupply of housing.’104 They describe how 
since the financial crisis ‘construction of new housing is down 50% in the United States and 
90% in Spain’. 105  Blackstone is therefore ‘part of the solution in helping to address the 
undersupply of housing by bringing capital, [and] increasing rental housing supply.’ 106 
Blackstone has ‘provided relief to devastated communities, confidence to homeowners 
regarding the value of their homes, spurred local economic growth and created local jobs by 
bringing capital and expertise to the residential rental market.’107 At the national, aggregate 
level in the US there are indicators of undersupply, but this is primarily a geographic issue 
caused by shifting employment opportunities.108 In areas of high employment expansion, such 
as San Francisco and Seattle, land is at a premium and there is little space left to develop.109 
Blackstone have focused their investments in these undersupplied areas, but it is not clear that 
they are helping to address the housing shortage in so doing.  
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Rather, the Blackstone model as described by the UN mandate-holders is to identify 
undervalued properties, often foreclosed or housing low-income individuals in areas 
experiencing gentrification, to purchase these homes and if necessary to renovate them, and to 
then offer them at much higher rental rates, thereby ‘pricing tenants out of their own homes 
and communities’.110 The UNSR states that, as of 2017, the Blackstone Group ‘spent $10 
billion to purchase repossessed properties in the United States of America at courthouses and 
in online auctions following the 2008 financial crisis, emerging as the largest rental landlord in 
the country.111 Similar companies in total ‘invested $20 billion to purchase approximately 
200,000 single-family homes in the United States between 2012 and mid-2013’.112 Blackstone 
‘has a portfolio of 82,260 single family rental homes across 17 markets in the United States of 
America, with a focus on the Western US (28,663 homes) and Florida (25,682 homes),’113 as 
well as many multi-family rental homes (generally apartment blocks) around the world.114 
Blackstone buys these homes by selling bonds ‘backed by the rental payments of properties 
and using the mortgages on the properties as collateral.’ 115  This model drives a need to 
maximise profits by restricting the quantity of affordable housing. The mandate-holders state 
that ‘only 1 percent of [Blackstone subsidiary] Invitation Homes SFRs [single family rentals] 
are allocated to lowest income tenants.’116 Similar practices at a smaller scale occurred in 
Czech Republic, Spain, and Sweden.117 
 
Blackstone state that ‘the answer to affordability is to increase the supply of housing.’118 But 
buying up foreclosed or otherwise undervalued properties is not necessarily achieving this aim, 
and certainly it would appear more conducive to the right to housing if community members 
had been able to purchase these homes. The human rights approach necessarily entails 
providing adequate housing for existing communities, particularly those on low-incomes, as 
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well as wealthier individuals.119 The allegation is that Blackstone is actively harming the 
former group through retrogressing affordability, and the response by Blackstone provides no 
counterevidence.  
 
4.1.2. Improving the Quality of Homes 
 
Blackstone’s second claim is that their investments are improving the habitability of homes, 
itself a criterion of the right to housing.120 In the US, through their subsidiary Invitation Homes, 
Blackstone has invested $2 billion in restorations, $22, 000 per property on average. 121 
Blackstone has ‘[p]rovided opportunities for people that can’t afford to buy homes with safe, 
high quality rental housing.’ In Sweden, ‘100% of all income from the company has been 
reinvested into its properties to provide a better living environment for its tenants.’ 122  
Moreover, ‘Invitation Homes has a 96% occupancy rate, high levels of customer satisfaction 
(4.4 out of 5 average resident rating), and residents renew their leases and stay on average 50% 
longer compared to the multifamily industry.’123  The methodology used for the customer 
satisfaction figures is not cited and the statistic could be problematic.124 A Blackstone report 
published in September 2019 that uses similar data states that ‘[a]ll figures are Blackstone 
proprietary data.’125 This lack of transparency makes the data unverifiable. We do not know 
how it was collected, response rates, or whether low-income residents have been replaced.  
 
The focus on habitability and satisfaction is a rebuttal to UN mandate-holder claims that 
Blackstone is pushing rental rates to unaffordable levels and combining this with exploitative 
fee charging systems. If customers are satisfied, they are presumably not unhappy with this 
system, and any rent increases correlate with improved habitability. The allegations in this area 
by the UN mandate-holders include that they have heard ‘countless stories of tenants’ whose 
buildings had been bought by private equity firms and whose rents had skyrocketed almost 
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immediately afterward, sometimes by 30 or even 50 percent, making it impossible for them to 
remain.’126 This includes Spain, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Denmark and multiple regions 
of the USA.127 In Madrid, for example, ‘Blackstone purchased over 1,800 units of social 
housing from the local government. Once tenants’ housing contracts expired, Blackstone raised 
rents to levels that were unaffordable for those who lived there, forcing many of them to leave 
their homes.’128 The UN mandate-holders state that Invitation Homes increased rent on average 
by 7% in Western (US) States in the third quarter of 2017, and contrast this with average 
increases of 3.9% in Los Angeles in the first quarter of 2017.129 Blackstone describes this as 
‘an apples and oranges comparison’ because the regions are different.130 Even so, an average 
rent increase of 7% for lower-income homes in a single quarter is not conducive to respecting 
the right to housing regardless of any comparative figures. The allegations against Blackstone 
in this area relate to affordability. Blackstone’s response does not adequately address the 
concerns, offering only tangential benefits of improved habitability that appears to exclude 
lower-income residents, in so doing fitting the gentrification model previously identified. 
 
The evidence on fee-charging is focused on Blackstone’s US subsidiary. ‘Invitation Homes has 
initiated a “national lease” policy which “standardizes rental fees across the portfolio,” and has 
designed a system to “track resident delinquency on a daily basis” in order to continually assess 
late fees.’131 Tenants must ‘pay fees for a number of infractions or services.’132 The ‘national 
lease and automated tenant-charge system [has driven] a 22% increase in ancillary income, 
resulting in $2 million of additional revenue.’133 ‘Invitation Homes – through an automated 
system – is quick to threaten eviction or file eviction notices due to late payment of rent or late 
of payment of fees (95 USD per incident), no matter the circumstances.’134 In Charlotte, North 
Carolina, ‘in 2013 Invitation Homes filed eviction proceedings against 10 percent of its 
renters.’135 Blackstone rebut this by writing that ‘the vast majority of individuals who receive 
such [eviction] notices stay in their home after working with the company to get back on 
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track.’ 136  However, individuals must still pay the fine and face the stress of eviction 
proceedings. Blackstone claim also to follow the law ‘to the letter’ in this regard.137 There is 
no suggestion that they do not, but there is a strong implication that Blackstone is exploiting 
the legal systems – its gaps and the rights it grants landlords – to maximize profits at the 
expense of individuals.  
 
4.1.3. Blackstone is a Responsible Landlord 
 
Third, Blackstone provide ‘responsible, proactive and professional ownership’.138 Blackstone 
describe how they promised to retain 5000 affordable homes from over 11000 in total when 
they purchased Stuyvesant Town in New York City – the largest apartment complex in 
Manhattan.139 However, of these 5000, 4500 should be classified as middle-income homes, 
with only 500 preserved for low-income families.140 One reason the complex is so profitable is 
that rent-controlled tenancies are in place at Stuyvesant Town, but are no longer being created, 
leading to a gradual quantitative decline.141 The proportion of such tenancies in the building 
has fallen from 99% in 2000 to 50% in 2015.142 Blackstone agreed to preserve 5000 existing 
‘rent stabilized tenancies’ for the next twenty years. They did this in exchange for $221 million 
in city funds through the waiving of mortgage recording taxes worth $77 million and a $144 
million loan that ‘will have a term of 20 years at 0% interest, with the principal amount… being 
forgiven annually at a rate of $7,185,937.50 per annum.’143 This means that Blackstone will 
not have to repay this loan.144 Blackstone is therefore merely ‘preserving the status quo in 
exchange for $221 million in taxpayer money and hundreds of millions more in development 
rights.’145  These development rights, also called ‘air rights’, are granted to developers that 
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have not used the maximum height allocation of a building, allowing them to transfer this 
capacity to another building. Stuyvesant Town comes with about 1 million square feet of air 
rights that Blackstone can either use elsewhere or sell-on. The exact value will depend on the 
specific deals struck, but one article estimates it could be worth around $625 million.146 
 
One reason the city was in a weak bargaining position was that the previous ownership, a 
partnership between investors Tishman Speyer and BlackRock, had used a heavily debt-
leveraged model and eventually defaulted on $4.4 billion in loans, abandoning the venture to 
CWCapital Asset Management which was tasked with managing the interim period and finding 
a new buyer.147 The Tishman deal, which took place in 2006, was described as ‘one of the 
biggest real-estate disasters of the financial downturn.’148 To recoup their losses, Tishman 
adopted the same practices now widely-alleged of Blackstone. They ‘infuriated tenants as they 
showered hundreds of residents with eviction notices. They renovated vacant apartments and 
rapidly raised rents.’149 This ownership situation granted Blackstone leverage, particularly as 
it was prepared to put significant liquidity into the deal rather than rely on debt, demonstrating 
the interconnectedness of market actors and market problems. One concern in the 
financialization of housing report is the increased precarity of housing as it becomes an 
investment commodity. 150  A poor financial decision by one group just before the global 
financial crisis opened the door to a lucrative opportunity for another group nine years later.  
 
Blackstone agreed to some relatively affordable homes at Stuyvesant Town only as a 
contractual stipulation and in exchange for other benefits. This suggests that Blackstone will 
respect the right to housing only insofar as that respect will help maximize profits, and this 
caveat is the locus of harm to affordability, security of tenure and other issues. This is perhaps 
obvious, but needs reifying where corporations are taking such a crucial position within human 
rights protection and claiming to be protecting the right of their own accord. This cannot be the 
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case regarding affordable housing in a booming market like New York City. Affordability will 
detract from profits, and so Blackstone will have to make a choice between profits and rights. 
That they required incentives to maintain the status quo at Stuyvesant Town shows where their 
priorities lie.  
 
4.2. Following Market Signals and the Law 
 
The second interesting part of the letter is that, without ever admitting to causing harm, their 
actions are set against the backdrop of an inalienable housing market guided by an invisible 
hand that forms a barrier against criticism. If Blackstone is causing harm, it is only because 
that is what the market demands, allows, or incentivizes. The foundation of this argument is 
that Blackstone has no monopoly power over the market. ‘Invitation Homes ‘has no ability to 
impact rents − it must follow market price or no one would rent from Invitation Homes.’151  
Blackstone make the same argument regarding their investment in Sweden.152 They add that in 
both cases, as well as in the Czech Republic, they follow the law stringently.153 ‘Invitation 
Homes represents… just 0.5% of the nearly 16 million single family homes in the US.’154 Quite 
apart from this being a large fraction for a single company to own in such a vast jurisdiction, 
the concentration of their properties in specific, ‘undervalued’155 markets means they could be 
having a direct effect on prices regionally. Nonetheless, Blackstone is keen to portray itself as 
just one small operator following market forces and obeying the law, and this is largely accurate. 
 
Blackstone state that ‘in the vast majority of markets where Invitation Homes operates, it is 
actually cheaper to rent rather than own a home. In Southern California and Seattle for example, 
it is $818 and $759 less expensive respectively per month to do so.’156 As such, Blackstone 
claim that their business plan provides benefits through making more, statistically cheaper, 
rental properties available. Even the raw statistic requires explanation because averaging 
flattens regional and quality disparities. But one reason renting is less expensive than buying 
must be that Blackstone and similar firms own so many homes in these regions that they are 
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choosing to let, rather than sell.157 When Blackstone increases rental prices by 7 per cent in one 
quarter, this will also impact purchase costs in the local area. It is reasonable to assume that 
most individuals would prefer to be investing in home ownership rather than losing money to 
a landlord every month. They cannot get on the housing ladder, as Blackstone state, because 
prices are too high. This market reality is contingent and is affected by the acts of investor-
landlords. Any number of state interventions into the market could improve this situation, from 
help-to-buy policies for individuals, to restrictions on investors. Blackstone prefers to see the 
market as inalienable – that purchase prices are innately this high, rather than contingent - 
because that renders invisible Blackstone’s relationship to the problem.  
 
As to the legal question, Blackstone is not breaching any laws, but it is exploiting laws that are 
not conducive to the right to housing anyway. Laws incentivize large-scale investments, such 
as through REITS, even where they may have deleterious effects on the right to housing. The 
law is permissive of harm as explained in each letter to states. Regarding evictions in the US, 
Blackstone write that ‘[t]here are fulsome consumer protections and often lengthy legal 
processes that Invitation Homes follows to the letter in the rare instances when an eviction 
becomes unfortunately necessary.’ 158  This does not adequately address the UN mandate-
holders concerns. They write that ‘in neighbourhoods heavily invested by private equity firms 
including Invitation Homes, more than 7,400 families and individuals are evicted every day.’159 
Such evictions and threats to evict are permitted in domestic law and guided by market forces, 
but may still breach both state duties and business responsibilities toward the right to housing. 
Relatedly, matters of government policy, such as the decision to sell Stuyvesant Town to 
another private company after the collapse of the previous ownership, are equally committed 
to an ideological, and indeed unspoken, vision of marketization that may not be conducive to 
the right. 
 
The market and the law thereby become the site of Blackstone’s personal exculpation. Where 
Blackstone is causing harm, it refers back to market forces and legal compliance. Issues such 
as seven per cent rent increases in a single quarter, ten per cent of residents facing eviction and 
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more generally, a for-profit company owning hundreds of thousands of homes around the world 
are neither illegal nor rooted in monopolistic corruptions of the market, but equally are not 
conducive to rights’ realization. Indeed, Blackstone’s tactics represent a market failure in 
human rights terms. The housing market, which could provide for universal housing is instead 
providing profits for the few and homelessness, evictions, indebtedness, and poverty for many.  
The market is failing to allocate resources ‘so as to ensure access’ to housing,160 even in the 
wealthiest states. For example, Los Angeles suffers from a poverty rate of 24.9 per cent when 
housing costs are factored in,161 and an income of $87,880 is needed to afford the median 
average rent.162  
 
It is worth clarifying that Blackstone is profiting handsomely from these tactics. Blackstone 
made $3.5 billion profit in 2018,163 and dividends rose 7.2%.164 Blackstone ‘capture[d] $43 
billion of capital inflows in the [first] quarter [of 2019] and a record $126 billion over the last 
twelve months.165 ‘Blackstone’s Total Assets Under Management now exceed half a trillion 
dollars, at $512 billion, up 14% year over year.’166 These profits provide strong evidence that 
the state could be intervening far more, without disincentivizing private investment in homes. 
Instead, Blackstone spent $6.3 million to help defeat Proposition 10 in California, which would 
have allowed implementation of rent control laws.167 These profit levels encourage increased 
exploitation. Today, global housing investments may no longer be yielding adequate profits – 
there is too much investment – and riskier forms of investment are growing, putting market 
stability at risk.168 
 
5. The Financialization of Human Rights 
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5.1. Human Rights Breaches by States and Business  
 
The letter to Blackstone is descriptive and only occasionally grounded in human rights law and 
argumentation. It is worth therefore spelling out the specific allegations against Blackstone and 
the states permissive of such practices, in legal terms. The seven criteria of the right to housing, 
the state duty to protect, and business responsibility to respect human rights are all relevant. 
Regarding the seven criteria, the overriding claim regards the retrogression of affordability. 
Affordability includes that ‘States parties [should] ensure that the percentage of housing-related 
costs is, in general, commensurate with income levels’ and that ‘tenants should be protected by 
appropriate means against unreasonable rent levels or rent increases.’169 This underlies other 
human rights issues including discrimination and unwarranted evictions.170 Other criteria that 
are likely to be affected include ‘availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure’, 
‘habitability’ and ‘location’.171 In each case lower-income residents may be pushed into sub-
standard conditions by the increased prices. ‘Legal security of tenure’ while specifically 
defining the legal standard, rather than business practices, is retrogressing insofar as Blackstone 
is exploiting the law for loopholes.172 Where applicable, the state is in breach of its duty to 
protect the right along these specific metrics173 and of ‘failing to regulate the real estate market 
and the financial actors operating on that market so as to ensure access to affordable and 
adequate housing for all.’174 The laws that permit these harmful actions should rightfully be 
defined as prohibited ‘deliberately retrogressive measures’ insofar as they enable the 
retrogression of the right.175  
 
Under the UNGPs, companies should avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts, defined as any business ‘action’ that ‘removes or reduces the ability of an individual 
to enjoy his or her human rights’.176 The ‘removal or reduction’ of individuals’ enjoyment of 
the right to housing along each of the criteria cited above is a verifiable consequence for at 
least some individuals whose homes are targeted by Blackstone. Where this occurs, Blackstone 
is causing an adverse human rights impact in breach in the corporate responsibility to respect 
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the right to housing. Principle 23 addressed the problem of state malevolence or inertia – i.e. 
rules that require or permit harmful practices. This states that: 
 
all business enterprises have the same responsibility to respect human rights wherever they operate. Where the 
domestic context renders it impossible to meet this responsibility fully, business enterprises are expected to respect 
the principles of internationally recognized human rights to the greatest extent possible in the circumstances.177 
 
This clarifies that business responsibilities exist even where the domestic context makes it 
difficult to comply with human rights standards. For Blackstone the situation is clear. It is 
operating in concordance with domestic legal standards, but it is far from ‘impossible’ to 
comply with human rights standards. Despite the permissive laws, therefore, Blackstone has a 
responsibility to respect the right to housing, meaning in this context to reduce costs, evictions, 
and other exploitations of the market. While the responsibility to respect is a social expectation, 
it can buttress already existing activist arguments against Blackstone’s practices,178 and could 
assist in generating negative public attention that forces a shift in behaviour.  
 
Both the ICESCR and the UNGPs set clear limits on how investors may impact individuals’ 
housing. The ICESCR prohibits acts that quantitatively retrogress low-income individuals’ 
access to housing. Rising homelessness, failure to guarantee secure tenure, and increased use 
of sub-standard housing also constitute state breaches. The UNGPs essentially transplant the 
same standards to corporations, through the umbrella prohibition on acts that remove or reduce 
individuals’ enjoyment of human rights, and the direct link to human rights treaty standards. A 
human rights approach to housing therefore requires that states and businesses act immediately 
to prevent any such retrogression or exploitation. Despite these standards, it is unclear whether 
any of the states mentioned above take the duty to avoid such retrogressions seriously. One 
problem in constructing a normatively powerful duty is that Blackstone’s method does not 
create a singular, obvious moment of violation,179 and other factors, such as immigration, may 
 
177 Guiding Principles, n 1, Principle 23. 
178 See e.g. in the US: Occupy Our Homes Atlanta, Blackstone: Atlanta’s Newest Landlord, April 2014, at: 
https://homesforall.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/BlackstoneReportFinal0407141.pdf (last visited 26 July 
2019); Cory Doctorow, Wall Street Landlords are Slumlords, BoingBoing, July 30 2018, at: 
https://boingboing.net/2018/07/30/single-family-rental-securitie.html (last visited 26 July 2019); Alana Semuels, 
When Wall Street Is Your Landlord, The Atlantic, February 13 2019, at: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/single-family-landlords-wall-street/582394/ (last 
visited 26 July 2019). 
179 Kenneth Roth, ‘Defending economic social and cultural rights: Practical issues faced by an international 
human rights organization’, 26 Human Rights Quarterly (2004), 63. 




interact with quantitative problems around affordability. It is useful to map the private actors 
involved and the laws constitutive of the problem, but it is difficult to define firm standards by 
which to hold states and corporations.180 Nonetheless, the financialized model does not appear 
to be conducive the right to housing and at times produces specific victims. As rights are 
becoming increasingly marketized,181 and the harm of that marketization spreads and deepens, 
human rights argumentation needs to develop so that demands to reshape markets and 
challenge market actors become as normatively forceful as those challenging torture and 
illegitimate killing.  
 
5.2. Challenging the Financialization of Human Rights 
 
Homelessness, evictions and severely unaffordable housing are increasing rapidly in wealthy 
jurisdictions that claim to respect to human rights. Corporate profit from this housing is 
increasing just as fast. The first step must be to challenge Blackstone and the jurisdictions 
permissive of them as to whether these practices are coherent with human rights standards. 
Specifically, is it conducive to the right to housing for Blackstone to own close to 100,000 
single-family rentals, and far more multi-family rentals, in the US? Is the mass purchasing of 
‘undervalued’ homes by Blackstone conducive to the right to housing? Is the maximization of 
profit organized through automated processes and leading to soaring increases in rent and late 
payment fees conducive to the right? If these acts are not conducive to the right should they be 
permitted? Are European countries wise to be welcoming actors such as Blackstone?  
 
Currently, Blackstone is breaching no domestic law and human rights argumentation appears 
neutered in the face of marketized housing. This suggests a larger role for political scrutiny: 
rather than the question resting on the reactive legality of the action it should rest on the 
proactive political question of whether this action is the most beneficial option for the right to 
housing. States must reify the right to housing as a core obligation of human rights and of 
human decency. States must take back control of their housing, including reviewing and 
 
180 Although the General Comment on Housing specifies that ‘the percentage of housing-related costs [should 
be] commensurate with income levels, it does not quantify this, see: General Comment 4, Housing, n 43, para. 
8(c). In the US the ‘definition of affordable housing is that a household spend no more than 30 per cent of its 
income on housing.’ See UNSR, USA Mission, n 69, para. 17. 
181 On food see: Anna Chadwick, ‘Regulating excessive speculation: commodity derivatives and the global food 
crisis’ International & Comparative Law Quarterly 66.3 (2017), 625; on healthcare see: Paul O’Connell, ‘The 
human right to health in an age of market hegemony.’ Global Health and Human Rights (John Harrington and 
Maria Stuttaford eds.) Routledge, 2010, 200.  




prohibiting, where necessary, large-scale purchases. States must close loopholes in tenancy 
rules. States must implement a binding commitment to a maximum income-housing costs ratio 
and a time-limited process by which to achieve it. Both the US and Canada use a 30% ratio, 
albeit neither is close to achieving this universally.182 Policies such as rent control,183 strict 
regulation on evictions and fee-charging, 184  and required private provision of affordable 
housing at new developments,185 exist in many areas around the world, albeit often partially 
and inadequately. The scale of investment and the range of new tactics suggests the era of 
strategic, minimalistic intervention by governments to guide and reinforce housing markets 
needs to end, precisely because firms like Blackstone have discovered how to exploit the 
system so well.  
 
Some argue that such policies cause negative externalities by distorting market provision.186 
How true this is ultimately rests on locally specific conditions. As noted, however, profits are 
vast, prices are skyrocketing, and there does therefore appear to be room in which governments 
can work to address their respective housing crises through regulation of profit-motivated 
private actors. It must be restated that housing markets are not simply ‘free’. REITs, support 
for buy-to-let mortgages, and poorly drafted laws that allow the letter but not the substance of 
the law to be followed are just three cases of market interventions by states that incentivize 
investors and that permit exploitation. Moreover, there is an ideological element to the debate 
wherein financialization must be challenged politically. Relevant questions here concern upon 
whom the externalities are visited, and whether mass ownership of homes by individual 
investment firms represents the ideal working of the free market.187 
 
 
182 Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, About Affordable Housing in Canada, March 31, 2018, 
[hereinafter Canada, Affordable] at: https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/developing-and-renovating/develop-new-
affordable-housing/programs-and-information/about-affordable-housing-in-canada (last visited 31 October 
2019); The Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defining Affordable Housing, HUD USER 
(undated), [hereinafter HUD, Affordable] at: https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr-edge-featd-article-
081417.html (last visited 31 October 2019). 
183 In place in certain areas of Ireland, see: Ireland Letter, n 4, 3. 
184 Per Norberg and Jakob Juul-Sandberg, ‘Rent control and other aspects of tenancy law in Sweden, Denmark 
and Finland: how can a balance be struck between protection of tenants’ rights and landlords’ ownership rights 
in welfare states?’ Paper presented at The European Network for Housing Research Conference, Belfast, United 
Kingdom (2016), 11-12. 
185 Kim McKee, Jenny Muir, and Tom Moore, ‘Housing policy in the UK: The importance of spatial nuance’ 
32.1 Housing Studies (2017), 60, 64. 
186 Explored in Jim Kemeny, From public housing to the social market, Routledge, 2002, 7-20. 
187 The ideological debates and history are well addressed in: David Harvey, A brief history of neoliberalism. 
Oxford University Press, USA, 2007. 




Indeed, the technical and definitional problems mentioned above are meaningful only if one 
believes that the human rights community must compel each victory from recalcitrant 
governments, or if one is wedded to free market ideology. Both assumptions are rooted in 
contemporary norms, but these norms are contingent and malleable. It was only a few 
generations ago, and prior to human rights treaties and the normative ‘breakthrough’ of human 
rights in the 1970s,188 that multiple governments set themselves an obligation derived from 
human decency to provide residents with habitable, affordable housing.189 This was largely 
achieved in many places with less technology and under greater external pressures than are 
faced today.190 Perhaps the language of decency, social cohesion and national development 
could provide a complementary basis for housing rights arguments alongside those rooted in 
the powerful, but also confrontational and sometimes difficult to prove terms of ‘violations’.191 
Concurrently, private actors should be addressed more directly. If market actors are controlling 
human rights materialities then every policy choice of these market actors must be subject to 
human rights critique.192 That Blackstone felt the need to reply just three days after the initial 
letter was sent suggests the company does feel a normative pressure to be seen to be respecting 
human rights.193 Serious and sustained critique of marketized rights is a necessary evolution in 
socio-economic rights discourse, and these letters provides a useful entry-point to begin such 
a project. 
 
Finally, such engagement could usefully address contemporary critiques that human rights 
discourse is inegalitarian and even conducive to neoliberal norms. Moyn, for example, argues 
that human rights are a ‘powerless companion’ to neoliberalism, incapable of challenging 
‘market fundamentalism’ 194  because of, first, human rights law’s predilection towards 
universal, minimal sufficiency,195 and second, because the moral(istic) discourse of human 
 
188 Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn (eds.), The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s, UPenn Press, 2015; 
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, Harvard University Press, 2010. 
189 Michael Harloe, The people's home?: social rented housing in Europe and America. John Wiley & Sons, 
2008. 
190 Including for example both the UK, wherein the government built 5.5 million social homes between 1950 
and 1980, and the Soviet Union, see: Raquel Rolnik and Lidia Rabinovich, ‘Late-neoliberalism: the 
financialization of homeownership and the housing rights of the poor’ in Aoife Nolon (ed.) Economic and 
Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis, CUP, 2014, 57, 59. 
191 This utility of a ‘violations approach’ is advocated for in: Audrey Chapman, A violations approach for 
monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1996) 18 Human Rights 
Quarterly, 23.  
192 General Comment 24, Business, n 48, para. 18-19; see also: Nolan, Privatization, n XXXXXXX, 840-2.  
193 Blackstone Reply, n 3, 1. 
194 Samuel Moyn, ‘A powerless companion: Human rights in the age of neoliberalism’ 77 Law & Contemporary 
Problems (2014), 147, 151 [Moyn, Powerless]; Moyn, Not Enough, n 14, 174ff. 
195 Moyn, Powerless, n 194, 161. 




rights occludes focus on structural economic questions.196 While this is not the space for a full 
elaboration of the critique and responses to it, it is worth noting that while Moyn’s 
problematization of historical practice is powerful, neither sufficiency nor moralism captures 
the full doctrinal or discursive framework of the ICESCR, as discussed above. Importantly, the 
CESCR is belatedly realising the extent to which markets are shaping socio-economic rights 
possibilities and is beginning to address the issue. As explicated above, states have duties to 
prevent third parties depriving individuals of access to rights,197 and duties to manage markets 
‘so as to ensure access’ to the rights in question.198 That human rights bodies have largely 
ignored the profit-motivated deprivation of access by businesses is a grave misstep, but it can 
be overcome within the doctrinal limits of the ICESCR. As the dangers of marketization 
become more apparent and oppositional discourses become mainstream,199 space will emerge 
for human rights-based critique of marketization, capable of using the discourse of fundamental 





This article has described and contextualized the letters exchanged between two UN human 
rights mandate-holders and the Blackstone Group L.P. discussing harm caused to the right to 
housing by the latter’s investments in therein. Blackstone is operating within the law and 
following market forces. Despite this, Blackstone is profiting from harm to the right to housing, 
particularly on the criterion of affordability, and causing further repercussive impacts to 
individuals, such as through evictions. The rapid global proliferation of the Blackstone model 
suggests that states do not see it as problematic. Indeed, states are ceding housing to the market 
at the expense of their human rights obligations. This cessation causes more harm than just the 
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Seymour, Corbyn: The strange rebirth of radical politics, Verso Books, 2017. 




direct human rights issues, the evictions, homelessness, and poverty. It transforms societies by 
turning communities into assets to be squeezed, displacing long-standing groups and denying 
the next generation the chance to lay the same roots, creating transiency and alienation. The 
future of housing, of many other socio-economic rights, and perhaps of communities 
themselves depends on forceful critique of markets, their constitutive rules and the private 
actors therein by human rights experts and activists. Both state obligations under the ICESCR 
and business responsibilities under the UNGPs are useful tools in this fight. Failure to make 
this case will allow the Blackstone model to spread to all jurisdictions and to all material rights, 
ultimately sacrificing human rights to the market.  
 
